Aesthetic perception and its minimal content: a naturalistic perspective by Ioannis Xenakis & Argyris Arnellos
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 19 September 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01038
Aesthetic perception and its minimal content: a naturalistic
perspective
Ioannis Xenakis1* and Argyris Arnellos 2*
1 Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering, University of the Aegean, Syros, Greece
2 The KLI Institute for the Advanced Study of Natural Complex Systems, Klosterneuburg, Austria
Edited by:
Bill Mace, Trinity College, USA
Reviewed by:
Giorgio Marchetti, Mind,
Consciousness, and Language
Research Net, Italy
Bill Mace, Trinity College, USA
*Correspondence:
Argyris Arnellos, The KLI Institute for
the Advanced Study of Natural
Complex Systems, Martinstraße
12,A-3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria
e-mail: argyris.arnellos@kli.ac.at;
Ioannis Xenakis, Department of
Product and Systems Design
Engineering, University of the
Aegean, Konstantinoupoleos 2,
Hermoupolis, GR-84100 Syros,
Greece
e-mail: ixen@aegean.gr
Aesthetic perception is one of the most interesting topics for philosophers and scien-
tists who investigate how it inﬂuences our interactions with objects and states of affairs.
Over the last few years, several studies have attempted to determine “how aesthetics
is represented in an object,” and how a speciﬁc feature of an object could evoke the
respective feelings during perception. Despite the vast number of approaches and models,
we believe that these explanations do not resolve the problem concerning the conditions
under which aesthetic perception occurs, and what constitutes the content of these
perceptions. Adopting a naturalistic perspective, we here view aesthetic perception as
a normative process that enables agents to enhance their interactions with physical and
socio-cultural environments. Considering perception as an anticipatory and preparatory
process of detection and evaluation of indications of potential interactions (what we call
“interactive affordances”), we argue that the minimal content of aesthetic perception is
an emotionally valued indication of interaction potentiality. Aesthetic perception allows an
agent to normatively anticipate interaction potentialities, thus increasing sense making
and reducing the uncertainty of interaction. This conception of aesthetic perception is
compatible with contemporary evidence from neuroscience, experimental aesthetics, and
interaction design. The proposed model overcomes several problems of transcendental,
art-centered, and objective aesthetics as it offers an alternative to the idea of aesthetic
objects that carry inherent values by explaining “the aesthetic” as emergent in perception
within a context of uncertain interaction.
Keywords: aesthetic perception, emotions, anticipation, perceptual content, interactive affordance, agency,
normativity
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Before explicit aesthetic judgments emerged in human culture,
individuals did not necessarily discriminate objects1 as exhibiting
a type of rightness– a “proper” organization of features2 –in their
structure from other objects that did not (Beardsley, 1975). How-
ever, from a phenomenological point of view, there was at least an
unspeciﬁed interest in some objects rather than others. The prob-
lem of rightness was introduced when scholars in the humanities
attempted to explain our interest in some objects (rather than oth-
ers) in terms of aesthetic values and properties that are connected
to “ideals” about beauty and ugliness, which provoke pleasure and
displeasure, respectively, in a perceiver. These special objects are
connected to a superior reality, one that demands exceptional
1The broad term “object” is preferred to the term “artifact” for the description of
the source of environmental stimuli. Such stimuli could refer to several categories
of objects or events from different domains, such as material and immaterial objects
(e.g., sounds, social events), living systems (e.g., other humans, animals), objects
which are intentionally designed (e.g., tools, artworks) or natural objects (e.g.,
landscapes), etc.
2The term “feature” is used to denote elements that constitute the structure of
an object (see footnote 1) as the ones of visual/musical/literary patterns, sub-
stances, physical, or other kind of properties, geometrical relationships, functional
characteristics, etc.
cognitive skills in order to be properly grasped. This is a tradi-
tion that persists from Plato to the contemporary literature on
aesthetics, and was re-enforced when Kant intoduced the term
of “disinterestedness” so as to express the state under which this
exceptional form of perception is possible. For Kant (1998, 2000)
and his followers, the experience of the transcendental aesthetic is
possible only when, during perception, someone can remove any
conceptual (e.g., purposive intention, an interest that may serve an
instrumental or ulterior purpose) and sensual processes, so that
one has only a pure intuition and the mere form of appearance.
When the above conditions are not met, the object cannot be per-
ceived aesthetically, which suggests that it was not an aesthetic
object.
Current practitioners of the above“art-centered” approach still
maintain a sharp distinction between works of art and everyday
objects that afford aesthetic and common perceptions, respec-
tively. In the last few years, models and explanations from other
scientiﬁc ﬁelds, which traditionally investigate cognitive behav-
ior, have been added to this approach. While ﬁelds such as
interaction design and psychology offer promising new meth-
ods and tools to study “the aesthetic” beyond transcendental
explanations, in many of these writings we can still see a strong
inﬂuence of the art-centered approach (see, e.g., Berlyne, 1971).
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This is quite evident in several contemporary studies that by
following a basically externalist account of aesthetic perception
aim to determine what organizations of features elicit aesthetic
responses (see, e.g., Locher, 2003; Bar and Neta, 2006; Noble
and Kumar, 2010). Even several works in neuroscience in which
authors attempt to ground and explain aesthetic perception in
termsof speciﬁc bio-cognitive functions subscribe to an externalis-
tic perspective aswell, as the neuroscientiﬁc experiments envisaged
focus almost exclusively on art-centered interactions (e.g., see
Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; de Tommaso et al., 2008; Mallon et al.,
2014).
The perspective we will defend is quite radical in that it
departs from traditional but also from several contemporary
philosophical conceptualizations of “the aesthetic” by opposing
the triad of transcendental, objective and art-centered aesthetics.
The “aesthetic” etymologically originates from the Greek word
αισθητικóς (aisthe¯tikos), meaning “the one who pertains/deals
with the senses,” which was derived from the word αισθα´νoμαι
(aisthanomai) meaning “I perceive, feel, sense.” On the same
grounds, Baumgarten introduced the term “aesthetics” as denot-
ing the fundamental cognitive task of knowing things through
the senses (Beiser, 2011). Nevertheless, according to Beardsley
(1969; 4), who is considered as one of the most important late
20th-century aestheticians, “Whatever its origin, this concept
undoubtedly achieved its fullest development and its richest appli-
cation in the aesthetic theory of John Dewey.”According to Dewey
(1980, p. 16) the experience of “the aesthetic” involves a “drama
in which action, feeling, and meaning are one.” For Dewey (1980,
p. 19) “experience is the fulﬁllment of an organism in its struggles
and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ. Even in
its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful
perception which is aesthetic experience.”
Dewey, then, argues that art and aesthetic experience are not
limited to the usual artistic objects but extend to all expressions
of life. Accordingly, our main aim in this paper is to investi-
gate the possible conditions under which aesthetic perception and
its minimal content is produced in all those expressions of life,
and particularly in everyday interactions beyond art that are not
commonly regarded as aesthetic. If one accepts that there are no
aesthetic objects per se, then an object is considered aesthetic with
respect to the interaction context in which it is perceived. Also,
since “the aesthetic” cannot be found in the object, those objects
that are nowadays widely considered aesthetic per se did not pre-
exist but the interactions with them have developed to the point
that we now consider these objects as such. In other words, there
is no such thing as an aesthetic object per se, but it is a particu-
lar interaction that might have an aesthetic dimension or not. As
Dewey (1980, p. 12) said, “the answers cannot be found, unless
we are willing to ﬁnd the germs and roots in matters of experi-
ence that we do not currently regard as aesthetic.” Hence, we are
interested in those “aesthetic” interactions and particularly in the
type that fosters the emergence of feelings that promote the con-
struction of a potential preference in everyday objects or state of
affairs, and which cannot be dealt with in the triptych of tran-
scendental, objective, and art-centered aesthetics. In this sense,
there are several everyday cases of interaction that most aestheti-
cians do not regard as “aesthetic” but in our view involve feelings
of a potential preference on the basis of which the “germs and
roots” of aesthetics are developed. These cases clearly illustrate
that “the aesthetic” is not a feature of the object. For instance,
some people feel they can be very productive when they ﬁnd
themselves in chaotic workplaces (e.g., Francis Bacon in his art
studio), while others feel they are completely unable to accom-
plish any task in such interactive (working) contexts. A car that
the designer expects to cause a tremendous thrill is perceived dif-
ferently in Western civilization and by indigenous people. In each
of these cases feelings may inﬂuence a potential preference that
may in turn become a judgment; or, for whatever reason, these
feelings can be modiﬁed during interaction. For example, users
may expect using a high-tech coffee machine to be the best way
to prepare a coffee, but they can change their mind during the
procedure. Someone could start feeling anxious and uncomfort-
able during a ﬁlm after having decided to watch it on the basis of
positive critiques from prior viewers who enjoyed it. Moreover, a
situation that is undoubtedly “aesthetic” for an art-centered aes-
thetician may not be perceived as such. For instance, some people
do not, cannot, or refuse to interact aesthetically with a famous
painting, while others can be totally indifferent independently
of the musician performing a well-known piece of music (see,
e.g., the Washington Post’s experiment with Joshua Bell). More-
over, the same agent can interact with the same “object” (or state
of affairs) through different feelings. For example, someone who
originally expected to spend a wonderful time as a tourist on a
island may later start feeling that it was a bad idea to spend the
rest of her life there. In all these cases of interaction the germ
of “the aesthetic” is developed when subjective expectations are
inﬂuenced by these feelings produced during the agent’s attempt
to assign meaning and understand the implications that a sit-
uation would have for its goals. Undoubtedly, the list of such
everyday interactive cases is endless, since a changing situation
is a new opportunity for the agent to cope with by develop-
ing feelings of various intensities that inﬂuence the construction
of the agent’s meanings and consequently the management of
interactions.
Our aim is not to explain all these phenomena completely.
This would be an extremely ambitious task given that aesthetic
perception is a multidimensional phenomenon involving several
different aspects of cognition and action (see, e.g., Leder et al.,
2004). Accordingly, we do not aim to explain what an agent specif-
ically likes or dislikes, and we don’t deal with the outcome of
particular aesthetic judgments or judgments of preference. We
rather suggest that all phenomena pertaining to “the aesthetic”
should be dealt with in a different theoretical and explanatory
context, the theoretical and conceptual basis of which we attempt
to provide here.
For naturalists such as Dewey and James, aesthetic percep-
tion, as any other type of perception, presupposes interaction.
Dewey (1929) has very effectively argued that perception is an
acknowledgment of unattained potentialities for interaction3. To
3In our understanding, unattained potential interactions do not concern only all
those preferred interactions, but as we will explain next (see footnote 11 in section
“Perception Within a Normative Account of Sense-Making”) they also refer to ideal
interactive outcomes that could be hardly accomplished. We call them optimal ways
of interaction.
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perceive is to refer the current situation to consequences and to
act accordingly. This means that perceivers are neither specta-
tors nor passive recipients of information from the environment.
Rather, they are cognitive agents that interact intentionally in their
environments. Thus, naturalists deny the possibility of disinter-
ested interactions. Perception is thus a predictive expectancy. For
Dewey, the potential consequences of interaction are the sense
that an object makes. This sense is a product of intellect and
inference usually associatedwith an aesthetic intuition, where feel-
ing, understanding, and action are one. As Dewey (1980; 15) has
stated “In a world like ours, every living creature that attains sen-
sibility welcomes order with a response of harmonious feeling
whenever it ﬁnds a congruous order about it.” In other words,
when the consequences of potential interaction are evaluated as
promising (anticipating) order or disorder, their perception is aes-
thetic in nature. In all, aesthetic perception contributes to sense
making4.
These aesthetic evaluative outcomes are evoked through the
emotions associated with the bodily and behavioral changes that
occur during an interaction (Shusterman, 2013). Indeed, all
relevant theoretical explanations and models, and all relevant
experimental studies suggest that all activities that are eventually
deemed aesthetic involve emotional processes of the same type
and mode of realization as those that inﬂuence and prepare an
agent to act (see, e.g., Chatterjee, 2011). The functional overlap-
ping of processes related to aesthetic responses to works of art with
those pertaining to emotional evaluation in any adaptive percep-
tion suggests that “the aesthetic” does not pre-exist (at least not
in the object itself), but on the contrary it emerges in perception
during interaction.
To sumup, in a naturalistic perspective“the aesthetic”should be
conceptualized and investigated as related to meaningful patterns
of activity, and therefore to action selection, and consequently
to the construction of preferences regarding the interaction with
certain objects, which in turn could be objects that we end up
liking or disliking5. Therefore, in this paper we are interested
in providing the conceptual and theoretical basis to explain the
emergence of feelings that promote the construction of a poten-
tial preference or interest in everyday objects or state of affairs,
and which cannot be explained in the externalist and art-centered
context of rightness. In accord with Rolls (2011), we claim that
such emotional feelings could emerge in every interaction under
4Interaction implies meaning and value about the current situation. A situation
acquires meaning or makes sense, when triggerings are related to agent’s ongoing
necessity for establishing a self-deﬁned normative status, relative to its bio-cognitive
organization and its goals. Sense making concerns endogenous activities, through
which the agent constructs its relation with the world. These endogenous activities
are what bring life to the world (for an extended analysis see Weber and Varela,
2002; Thompson and Stapleton, 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011). Sense-making
is purposive and functional but it does not always suggest action (Burge, 2009).
However, sense making is fundamental for action selection, a process by which
the agent differentiates between relations/situations and chooses the best for its
norms and goals (Bickhard, 2006). We call these differentiated relations“meaningful
patterns of activity.”
5At this point, an obvious objection from the traditional aesthetician could be that
whatever we prefer is not always what we consider as beautiful. Nevertheless, our
aim is not to discuss the concept of beauty, because, as it is probably the most
prominent of aesthetic concepts, it also must have been evolved during the various
socio-cognitive interactions (see also below).
the appropriate conditions, and they could be the origin of sev-
eral types of aesthetic judgments. It should be noted that these
feelings can only partially inﬂuence the agent’s actions or judg-
ments in the given conditions. The proposed model does not
cover all other factors and aspects (e.g., rational inferences, learn-
ing, acting by habit or by analogy making, etc.) that inﬂuence
an agent’s judgments, and which provide other values inﬂuenc-
ing sense making and the respective content. We deal with the
minimal content of aesthetic perception. Accordingly, we here
deal neither with beauty and ugliness nor with the modeling of
such judgments. More speciﬁcally, we do not deal with whether
designed objects like a car, a mailbox, a coffee machine, a din-
ner table, the cockpit of a jet airliner, a work of art or objects
of nature (e.g., a landscape, or other human beings and ani-
mals) are beautiful or not. Actually, according to the perspective
offered here we completely dismiss such a question. What we are
interested in is to provide the theoretical basis to understand the
general characteristics and requirements of the interaction con-
text within which agents aesthetically perceive or feel like that
is possible (or tend) to engage with the above things in spe-
ciﬁc interaction contexts by following these feelings. We will
argue that such emotional feelings add an aesthetic dimension
to every interactive situation, and consequently to the respective
objects.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section “Aes-
thetic Perception and Objects” we show that an understanding
of aesthetic perception as intrinsically embodied in the “aesthetic
object,” or as belonging to unintentional forms of perception, can-
not provide a model of aesthetic perception that will satisfactorily
reply to the issues raised above. In section “Aesthetic Perception in
theContext of InteractivismandEmbodiedCognition”wedevelop
a model of aesthetic perception that is consistent with living
agency, particularly with its normative characteristics. In section
“Perception Within a Normative Account of Sense-Making” we
focus on the necessary organizational requirements for agency at
a level that supports perception through the construction of emo-
tionally based meaningful patterns of activity. Then, in section
“Aesthetic Emotions and Their Role in Sense-Making”we provide
neurophysiological evidence of human agency in order to support
our claims for the respective organizational aspects. Finally, in
section “A Model for Aesthetic Perception and Its Minimal Con-
tent” we suggest that aesthetic perception, through its minimal
content, has an adaptive preparatory and anticipatory nature,
the normative function of which is to evaluate, through emo-
tions, the appropriateness of a potential interaction6. Our view is
mostly based on contemporary theories and explanations in the
realm of interactivism and embodied cognition, contemporary
evidence from emotional theory, neuroscience, and ﬁndings from
6An agent interacts within an environment according to certain norms. Norms
provide the agent with characteristic information about the relation between
the ongoing interaction and the conditions for the maintenance of its organiza-
tion closure (Christensen and Hooker, 2000; Bickhard, 2006). Normativity refers
to the value attribution that is given to a process or interaction (e.g., adap-
tive or maladaptive to an interaction or process in an organism) with respect
to a certain norm, i.e., with respect to whether a standard or level of possible
performance—that is in some way adequate for a fulﬁllment of a function—is
satisﬁed by that very process or interaction (see Barandiaran and Moreno, 2008;
Burge, 2009).
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relevant studies in the experimental aesthetics and interaction
design.
AESTHETIC PERCEPTION AND OBJECTS
THE AESTHETIC OBJECT AND ITS RIGHTNESS
This section discusses the common view that aesthetic perception
bears an objective part in its content, one that enables the catego-
rization of some objects as aesthetic. Quite often in the literature,
aesthetic objects are considered all those things that “carry a cer-
tain function”: to provoke an aesthetic form of response, to transmit
information that evokes an aesthetic interest or experience (see, e.g.,
Ingarden, 1961; Walsh, 1974; Lind, 1980; Carroll, 1986; Bennett,
2002). However, there is an unclear assumption in this deﬁni-
tion. Even though it is accepted that the object is subjectively
evaluated in experience, authors do still believe there is somehow
a kind of “objectivity” in perception. From this perspective, the
object carries something special within its properties, some percep-
tual features, the communication of which could explicitly relate
the object to aesthetic forms of response (see, e.g., Leder et al.,
2004; Tilghman, 2004; Brandt, 2006; McManus et al., 2011). In this
respect, aesthetic perception depends on the detection of “right-
ness,” the formalization of which is associated with an aesthetic
property. Rightness and aesthetic properties may have positive or
negative values. Their perception is determinedby a“proper”orga-
nization of non-aesthetic features but cannot be reduced to them
(see also Levinson, 2005, 2011). For instance, something is “gar-
ish” when it has a pattern of bright colors, but bright colors are
not aesthetic per se; they are just pigments. They constitute “gar-
ish” only when they are applied “properly.” However, “garish” has
usually a negative meaning, especially for those for whom bright
colors are not their style. Notwithstanding this, the application
of the “aesthetic in objects,” especially since the Bauhaus school,
was nevertheless related to ﬁxed norms or hardwired principles
that guide designers and artists in formalizing their sense of right-
ness into aesthetic properties (Kim, 2006). This was for years a
“safe” strategy to place the object in the category of “the aesthetic.”
Following this mostly institutional strategy several scientiﬁc ﬁelds
have attempted to objectify aesthetics. Taking into account the
impact speciﬁc organizations of features may have in aesthetic
perception (see, e.g., Silvera et al., 2002; Bar and Neta, 2006), sev-
eral studies aim at measuring them, and objectifying their design
by proposing them as aesthetic indexes (see, e.g., Jacobsen et al.,
2006; de Tommaso et al., 2008). However, studies that test the
validity of these general laws have not yielded satisfactory results
with respect to the establishment of a general explanatory model
of aesthetics (Leder et al., 2004). In general, empirical aesthetics,
based on an art-centered tradition, has difﬁculty modeling and
generalizing aesthetic guidelines even for simple interactive cases
dealing with relatively simple forms of organization of features7.
7AsCua and Fletcher (1975) have remarked long ago, all these theoretical or practical
guidelines suggest a set of requirements for aesthetic rightness without providing
any hint of how a set of features could be successfully embodied in an object, or
how could it be successfully perceived in different contexts. Even works such as
Birkhoff’s (1933) that propose mathematical tools for accomplishing the rightness
for aesthetic properties such as balance, equilibrium, symmetry etc., and which
have inﬂuenced several similar approaches, argue that it is not realistic to expect
from these models to provide either a description and/or to determine aesthetic
perception and evaluation.
In addition, experimental ﬁndings indicate that what is consid-
ered as right is subjective and not always perceptible by everyone,
since perceptual content is dynamically inﬂuenced by personal
meanings and values (Locher, 2003) as well as by the context of
interaction (Blijlevens et al., 2012). Moreover, experimental evi-
dence suggests that aesthetic perception is mostly related to one’s
idea of rightness as an optimal organization that cannot be reduced
to a speciﬁc placement of featureswithin that organization (Locher
et al., 1999). The subjectivity in the communication of rightness
is compatible with contemporary approaches to the “design pro-
cess8.” The communication of rightness concerns both those who
design an experience through a medium (design, artwork, etc.),
and those who are engaged in an experience through this medium
(Arnellos et al., 2010a). Designers seek to formalize their own idea
of rightness into a designed medium by choosing out of unlimited
possibilities those that are anticipated to engage perceivers and
provide an optimal interaction (Xenakis and Arnellos, 2012). Per-
ceivers should similarly detect the designer’s idea of rightness in
these mediums or to perceive their own rightness. The latter may
correspond to personal optimal ways of interaction that hardly
coincide with a designer’s ideas. Moreover, an understanding of
aesthetics, focusing on the perception of speciﬁc properties that
constitute rightness does not explain the content of aesthetic per-
ception. Especially when perceivers cannot see the designer’s idea
of rightness, they see their own rightness or they do not care about
rightness (Frohlich, 2004). Hence, if we accept the idea that some-
thing “transforms” an organization of non-aesthetic features to
aesthetic properties it seems that this transformation is not due
to the object itself but rather due to perceptual processes real-
ized in a context whose characteristics and properties are still in
question.
Kantiandisinterestedness (Kant,2000)provides apossible expla-
nation to this “special” context within which an agent perceives
something aesthetically or not. According to Kant, emotions of
pleasure and pain involved in aesthetic perception are uninten-
tional (free from any kind of desire, aim, or purpose, or any
social, moral, or intellectual considerations), in contrast to inten-
tional reasonable thoughts involved in non-aesthetic perception.
Inﬂuenced by the above difference, several authors approach “the
aesthetic” as a property that has a vague relationship, or no rela-
tionship at all, to more pragmatic features that are associated with
an object’s perceived usability, functionality, and instrumental-
ity9 (see, e.g., Brandt, 2006; Hassenzahl, 2008; Moshagen and
8The design process may be abstractly conceived as a future-anticipating activity
that creates visions of a desirable future among groups of agents (Arnellos et al.,
2007). Therefore, design should primarily be considered as a process of cognitive
construction. In this perspective, the notion of “design” encompasses all relevant
activities pertaining to the creation of a communicative medium, as it most promi-
nently happens in the domains of humanities and liberal arts, human professions
and services, creative and applied arts, and technology and engineering (Friedman,
2003).
9Instrumentality focuses almost exclusively on the achievement of mainly behav-
ioral tasks during an interaction with an object. The study of task achievement is
very important in user centered analysis and evaluation techniques (e.g., usability
testing), making the instrumentality of an object a major goal in the ﬁeld of inter-
action design. In this context, a hedonic response is related to self-advancement,
self-presentation, and other self-referential goals, where the perceived objects are
media by which perceivers can express their selves and communicate (Hassenzahl,
2008).
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Thielsch, 2010). While objectives of utility and functionality are
always designed and perceived intentionally (Crilly et al., 2009),
the design and perception of “the aesthetic” lack such character-
istics. Traditionally, in the design process “aesthetic phenomena
seem apparently useless” as their perception emerges unintention-
ally during interaction (Hekkert, 2006, p. 161; see also Hekkert
and Leder, 2007). This argument is quite radical, if not simply
untenable, when seen in a naturalized context. Nevertheless, it
still does not devoid “the aesthetic” from its normative dimen-
sion. Normativity plays a fundamental role in sense making and
more generally in the characterization of agency in living sys-
tems (Barandiaran and Moreno, 2008; Burge, 2009; Arnellos et al.,
2010b; see Christensen, 2012 for further analysis). As we argue in
section “Aesthetic Perception in the Context of Interactivism and
Embodied Cognition,” agents use their emotions normatively and
produce meaning from their environment, even when these agents
apparently remain inactive or seem to have no relation with their
physical and social environments (Damasio, 1995). Moreover, it
is now accepted among emotional theorists that emotions are not
elicited in isolation and that they play an important role in sense
making, even though agents may not be fully aware of those pro-
cesses (see, e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Rolls, 2011). In addition,
several studies have shown an unexpected correlation between
aesthetics and instrumentality during the overall experience with
objects (see, e.g., Tractinsky et al., 2000).
Returning to our initial inquiry concerning the possibility that
aesthetic perception bears an objective part in its content, one
which is intrinsically related to features, we could conclude that it
is naïve to think that “the aesthetic” is pre-given to perception as a
ready-made element reduced to speciﬁc organizations of features
(Mitias, 1982). On the contrary, as we discuss in the next section,
other aestheticians who aim at specifying the context in which one
perceives an organization of non-aesthetic features as aesthetic
properties argue in favor of an anticipatory content of an object.
THE ANTICIPATORY CONTENT OF AESTHETIC PERCEPTION
We focus on two theoretical problems relevant to our pur-
poses. The ﬁrst one concerns the facultative nature of all those
mechanisms producing an aesthetic perception, while the sec-
ond concerns the understanding of the relation between those
mechanisms and the “proper” organizations of features usually
characterized as aesthetic properties. The second problem is
related to the hypothesis that the perception of aesthetic properties
is a category distinct from any other ordinary form of perception.
According to contemporary aestheticians (e.g., Sibley, 1959,
1965, 2001; Carroll, 1999; Matravers and Levinson, 2005; Levin-
son, 2006, 2011), aesthetic properties are mostly proposed to be
higher-order ways of appearing. Examples may include (but are
not limited to) properties such as delicate, graceful, uniﬁed, inte-
grated, and so on. Sibley and Levinson argue that the perception
and understanding of these higher-order ways of appearing is
emergent and cannot be reduced to speciﬁc organizations of non-
aesthetic features, known as lower-order ways of appearing (e.g.,
colors, textures, timbres, etc.). More speciﬁcally, a higher-order
way of appearing emerges from lower-order ways of appearing
as a result of emotional and conceptual processes. Thus, these
lower-order ways are always open to interpretation. While this
argument seems valid from the point of view of semantics and
concept formation, it does not explainwhich part of the interactive
process alters an ordinary interpretation into an aesthetic one. If
there is a distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic prop-
erties, then there must be an as yet unspeciﬁed aspect during
perception that guides perceivers exclusively to aesthetic forms of
response.
Matravers and Levinson (2005) try to overcome this predica-
ment by suggesting that aesthetic properties pull their metaphysi-
calweight into some explanatory value in objects,“in the sense both
of explaining the experience we have of them and of explaining the
normativity that attaches to attributions of them” (p. 214). What
they propose is that beholders are motivated to assign explanatory
values to objects so as to specify those things an object could offer
them during an experience. In other words, aesthetic properties
become ways of being that are closely related to possibilities of a
future state, and such possibilities are evoked from the appearance
of the object.
However, this does not explain the facultative nature of the
evaluative process, whichmotivates perceivers to use values during
aesthetic perception. As we discuss in section “Aesthetic Percep-
tion in the Context of Interactivism and Embodied Cognition,”
the framework for concept formation used by Matravers and
Levinson applies to all the ways in which agents are engaged in
meaningful interactions with their environments. In a naturalized
context of interaction, agents make sense of their environment
by assigning values to possibilities of future states according to
theirmotives and goals (Christensen,2012). So,what distinguishes
a value that serves an agent’s adaptive perception from an aes-
thetic one is still in question, while the allegedly special aspect,
which guides perceivers exclusively to aesthetic forms of response,
remains unspeciﬁed. Quite recently, Sauchelli (2013) has claimed
that adaptive goals may inﬂuence a perceiver’s aesthetic percep-
tion. In particular, Sauchelli proposes that “proper function,”
which he considers a function that is known for accomplishing
the goals an object is designed for, may inﬂuence a perceiver’s
expectations and, consequently, the aesthetic perception itself.
These expectations for Sauchelli are beliefs “concerning how a
certain function should or will be realized in a form in order for
the resulting object to be suited to its function” where “beliefs
are the result of our previous experiences with objects appear-
ing to have the same (or similar) functions” (p. 46). Sauchelli
considers a certain range of aesthetic judgments – those that
involve only functional aspects. However, as he argues, his the-
ory does not imply that beauty (whatever the term might means)
should be explained solely in terms of function (as utility) or
that ascriptions of beauty should always be grounded in expec-
tations. Sauchelli, then, allows for the consideration of other
forms of “aesthetic perception” that are beyond this category of
functional interactions. Moreover, his aesthetic theory is based
on anticipation, which presupposes established knowledge and
experiences. As we argue below, the emergence of the aesthetic
perceptual content may beneﬁt from previous experiences but
does not presuppose their existence. For instance, agents do not
need to know how football shoes function in order to anticipate
an optimal “football play.” Most of the time users are incapable
of detecting scientiﬁc improvements in a football shoe that will
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provide them with an advanced control of the ball. Their evalua-
tions are thus based on a great number of goals/standards/criteria
that constitute their personal norms. For example, none of this
scientiﬁc information is useful (or relevant) when the agent’s
goal is to provoke other players or spectators to turn their eyes
to his feet during a play (including cases where the agent is not
a good player). Thus, different goals provide to the agent dif-
ferent evaluative frameworks under which the shoe is perceived
and probably used. This is why football shoes designers do not
limit their ideas to shoes that provide only a good control of the
ball, but rather attempt to design the whole experience includ-
ing all those social implications that affect our interaction with
products.
Quite interestingly, Beardsley (1970) under Dewey’s inﬂuence
uses the terms “commodity” and “ﬁrmness” in a manner reminis-
cent of Sauchelli’s“proper function.”Commodity is about function
and refers to features that make objects appropriate (proper) for
what they are designed for, while ﬁrmness is about construction
and refers to the right organization of features in an object. Specif-
ically, Beardsley argues that good engineering, good organization,
and usefulness are factors that improve people’s lives and lead
beholders to perceive an object from “an aesthetic point of view.”
Accordingly, perceivers assign aesthetic values to objects because
they are in position to detect a speciﬁc value in them accord-
ing to their interests. When somebody estimates an aesthetic
value, she forms an expectation or anticipation that the estimated
result will conform to or promote her personal (aesthetic or not)
goals/standards/criteria (see pp. 44–45).
Therefore, anticipation in aesthetic perception implies an eval-
uation mechanism inﬂuenced by criteria that help perceivers to
evaluate an object on the basis of those aspects that will some-
how be fulﬁlled when the object is used in the future. Because
of this, the content of positive aesthetic evaluation is related to
an anticipation of pleasure that the object could offer to the per-
ceiver in accordance with her goals/standards/criteria. Thus, “the
aesthetic” is evoked in perception, when an offer of goal fulﬁllment
is obtainable in the object in the sense that its organization could
support an interpretation of what the perceived objectmight afford
or offer.
Our aim is to elaborate the above conceptualization of “the
aesthetic” into a normative account of perception by proposing
a model that aims at describing and explaining the facultative
nature and the interactive properties of the underlying embod-
ied mechanisms. In the next sections we discuss some general
but key characteristics of a naturalistic framework of percep-
tion based on contemporary theories and explanations in the
realm of embodied cognition and interaction, with a focus
on the role of emotions in the anticipatory preparation for
sense making. The proposed model of aesthetic perception is
also compatible with contemporary evidence from emotional
theory, neuroscience, experimental aesthetics, and interaction
design.
AESTHETIC PERCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERACTIVISM AND EMBODIED COGNITION
The naturalistic context in which we attempt to explain the aes-
thetic perception opposes any dissociation between perception
and cognition, according to which cognition diverges from per-
ception as a non-perceptual faculty or conversely, perception
diverged from cognition focusing on bottom-up sensory mech-
anisms and ignoring top-down effects. Our arguments are based
on evidence suggesting that perception and cognition share com-
mon bio-cognitive systems, which are simultaneously operating
in the same mechanisms (Barsalou, 1999). This does not mean
that perception and cognition are identical, but rather they share
content during sense making.
PERCEPTION WITHIN A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF SENSE-MAKING
Agency presupposes normative interaction. It concerns the ability
of the agent to interact with its environment by taking the initiative
based only on its self-deﬁned norms (Arnellos et al., 2010b). In
this way, agents should always at least try to select which of the
interaction alternatives are the best to engage in (Seth, 2007). This
initial urge for selection is what generates meaningful patterns of
activity. Selecting the best alternative does not refer only to those
interaction alternatives that preserve an agent’s viability, but also to
thoseways of interaction thatwill increase itswellbeing. Aswe shall
see, such selection implies an agential organization that enables the
agent to direct itself toward those indications10 of interaction that
will better satisfy its norms.
For such selection to be possible, all alternatives (in some
functional sense) shouldbe indicated as available potential interac-
tions. The relation between an indication (e.g., a trafﬁc jam in the
highway) and its interaction potentiality (e.g., the agent alters its
course) refers to the consequences of this indication for the agent
(see Bickhard, 1993) and presupposes an agential organization
that supports evaluation mechanisms that are able to character-
ize the indicated situation as potential or not. Thus, interactive
indications have an anticipatory nature, and if selected, they can
indicate true or false, right or wrong (Bickhard, 2006). Based on
these norms, the agent can detect the error in case the action does
not yield the anticipated outcome. Now, it should be noted that
indications are sufﬁcient to the potentiality of what they indicate
(Bickhard, 1993; 301). In other words, there could be several other
indications of the same interaction potentiality, and/or the agent
could be in other interactive conditions than the one anticipated.
Thus, an indication per se does not specify a feature of the environ-
ment, but rather provides the agent a normative way (through its
organization) to determine if such indication holds or not, while
all these indications have always the possibility of failure (Bickhard,
2000). This possibility of failure is what introduces uncertainty in
interaction (interaction uncertainty), in the sense that the agent
is uncertain about the consequences that the interactive indications
may have with respect to its norms (see also Xenakis and Arnellos,
2012).
10In general, indications are considered to be relations between environmental
conditions and potentially functional processes of an agent. For instance, a high
environmental temperature could be an indication for sweating. For a detailed
account of the notion of “indication” in the framework of Interactivism, see Bick-
hard (1993; 301). We note that for such an indication to hold the process of sweating
and the respective “infrastructure” should be there and available to the agent even in
the absence of the respective environmental conditions. This is a conditional rela-
tion between a sensory input and a value-rich indication of a potential interaction
based on this input (Bickhard, 2006).
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A normative account of meaning-based interaction presup-
poses, then, that agents set their own norms (either implicitly
or explicitly) and form meaningful patterns of activity accord-
ingly. They do this by directing and evaluating indications with
respect to these norms. According to their capacity, agents can
construct new norms, which can be modiﬁed in the future. These
could be general norms stemming from generalized preferences
that provide normative orientation with respect to widely inte-
grative aspects of wellbeing (Christensen and Hooker, 2000). A
generalized norm could indicate the optimal way of interaction11.
This could be used as a reference point by which agents evaluate
their interactions.
To sum up the arguments made so far, for an agent to be able
to direct itself toward those interactions that will better satisfy
its norms, the agent should exhibit the capacity to differentiate
between situations in the environment. Situations (or relations)
are differentiated by their interaction potentialities in the sense
that in each situation the agent anticipates the realization of those
actions thatwill better satisfy its norms. Thus, a normative account
of sense making is future-oriented and has a preparatory and
anticipatory character, which is also subject to dysfunction or fail-
ure (Skewes and Hooker, 2009; Bickhard, 2011). The respective
interactive-feedback loop provides the agent with the capacity
to learn from its failure, and consequently, the possibility for a
more elaborated adaptive interaction in the future is increased
(Christensen and Hooker, 2000; Bickhard, 2006; Arnellos et al.,
2010b). Adaptive agents thus actively construct a relation between
them and their world. Certainly, this relation is not pre-given
but emergent and evoked during interaction. It thus constitutes
a sense-making process in which the agent actively constructs
a body-mind-environment relation (Thompson and Stapleton,
2008).
In the context of sense-making sketched above, perception is
considered a process by which agents are enabled to functionally
detect all those interactive indications that could form their rela-
tion with the world. Therefore, perception refers to a web of ways
of interaction, which constitutes the current situation. In such
a naturalistic but non-reductionist account, perception has the
normative function of signaling the agent for both internal and
external modiﬁcations that will allow the agent to further its pur-
poses (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Particularly, perception functions as
a preparatory-anticipatory process, throughwhich agentsmonitor
and manage the respective interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs
by evaluating them with respect to the consequences they have
for their norms. Therefore, the content of perception is norma-
tive, and should be understood with respect to the interaction. More
11Anoptimal interaction is determinedby the agent’s norms and is thus dynamic and
ill-deﬁned. Optimal interactions are not only the “preferred” ways of interaction,;
they could also refer to ideal interactive outcome that could be hardly accomplished.
For instance, a student driver may anticipate that after a few lessons he will be able to
perform like a F1 driver. Although an “ideal” interactive outcome, since the student
has minimal or no possibilities to accomplish it, it could nevertheless be considered
an optimal way of interaction for the student. Moreover, what the student driver
anticipates about the optimal driving of a car is different from what his or her
instructor anticipates. It follows that in many circumstances, preferred and ideal
ways of interaction will coincide. These personal optimal ways of interaction could
be a referencepoint bywhich the student and the instructor evaluate their interaction
possibilities and their progress in the course of action.
speciﬁcally, perceptual content is the emergent outcome of an evalu-
ation process, throughwhich the agent is facilitated in constructing its
relation with the world by selecting the best indications of interaction
according to its norms. Objects are thus perceived as evaluated indi-
cations of potential interactions, otherwise agents could not make
sense of these objects (Nanay, 2012; Xenakis and Arnellos, 2013).
Since the agent always updates its situational knowledge, the situ-
ation is not static and the content of perception is itself dynamic
(Bickhard, 2009). Such updates may be based on an agent’s inner
state, the whole or parts of the situation, properties of objects
in the situation, objects in certain relations in the situation, or
all the above (Burge, 2005). In accordance with the preparatory-
anticipatory character of perception, its content would not always
imply a successful interaction outcome, but its occurrence seems
necessary for any contribution to the world.
Within this naturalistic account of perception, aesthetic per-
ception could not be a distinct kind, or a perception plus
something aesthetic. As any other form of perception, aes-
thetic perception should have a normative content through which
the agent actively relates itself to the world. In addition,
aiming at a naturalized explanation concerning aesthetic per-
ception, we need to consider such perception as a process
grounded in the agent’s organization, just as any other bio-
cognitive process that serves the agent’s adaptability and well-
being. As we suggest in the following sections, a naturalistic
account of aesthetic perception should be grounded on emo-
tions.
What we have argued so far is that the content of perception
emerges when the agent detects and evaluates indications of poten-
tial interactions, namely, the actions being available to the agent
at the exact time of interaction (Bickhard, 2011). As mentioned
before, by directing and evaluating these indications the agent is
able to prepare itself, to anticipate the outcome of the interaction,
and to act accordingly. Therefore, during perception every object
is evaluated with respect to the range of potential interactions it
could afford in the current situation.
This notion of “evaluated indications of potential interactions”is
reminiscent but not fully compatible with the Gibsonian concep-
tionof “affordances.”More speciﬁcally, in accordancewithGibson
(1986) we also conceive affordances as possibilities for action that
denote a relation between properties of the environment and of
the agent. However, contrary to our view, for Gibson (1986; 127)
affordances are based on the idea that “values” and “meanings” of
things can be directly perceived in the sense that such values and
meanings are external to the perceiver. This makes affordances
both objective, real, and physical (unlike the orthodox conception
of values and meanings) and at the same time subjective since
they refer to the agent. The values and meanings of affordances
are speciﬁed in the structure of ambient light as information with
which agents establish perceptual content. For Gibson affordances
are invariant combinations of ecological properties of things taken
with reference to the agent’s biological and social needs as well as
its action-systems and its anatomy. Although Gibsonian affor-
dances refer to agents, they are permanent in the sense that they
do not change as the needs of the agent change. This means that
even though an agent’s preferences could ﬂuctuate, (something
that the agent likes today may look bad tomorrow) affordances
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stay invariant. Affordances do not cause behavior but constrain
or control it (Gibson, 1982; 410–411). Now, apart from these
apparent differences to our framework, Gibson (1986; 143) talks
about basic affordances of the environment, which are usually
perceived directly, without an excessive amount of learning. How-
ever, as Shaw (2003; 82) has claimed there are interactive cases
“where Gibson allowed perception to be indirect where paintings,
photographs, TV, movies, virtual realities, and other facsimiles of
reality are concerned, although he strongly opposed the traditional
attempts to reduce all perception and cognition to being indirect,
that is, mediated by memorial states or inferential processes.” This
is probably a reason why Gibson says that aesthetic objects are
different cases and the respective “problems of aesthetics exist in
their own right” (Gibson, 1986; 291). As Gibson (1986; 273) has
stated:“We can distinguish between a surface as an aesthetic object
and a surface as a display of information. The surface that displays
information may also be an aesthetic object, but the cases are differ-
ent. A picture is a surface that always speciﬁes something other than
what it is.”
Our view of affordances is more akin to Chemero’s (2003);
affordances cannot be properties, or even features, of the envi-
ronment alone. Affordances are features of whole situations and
this whole supports (perhaps demands) a certain kind of action.
Affordances for Chemero are not in the environment but rather
they are relations between the abilities of an agent and fea-
tures of the environment: “An animal typically perceives only
the affordance relation, though, and not the constituent relata.”
(p. 191) Chemero clearly aims at a normative explanation of
affordances. The normative aspect in his explanation for affor-
dances as relations is based on the agent’s abilities. As he states,
agents with abilities are supposed to behave in particular ways,
and they may fail to do so. This explanation puts the normative
aspect of the perceptual content in the agent and not externally
to it.
However, based on our claims in the beginning of this section,
our model of the perceptual process differs in some respect from
Chemero’s explanation. More speciﬁcally, Chemero says: “I am
normally not aware of anything about my climbing abilities or riser
heights when I perceive that I can climb a step. Humans, how-
ever, can—with training, and when so inclined—perceive things
about their abilities and the features of the environment” (p. 191).
Although both Chemero and us try to conceptualize affordances
in a relational context, our model puts the emphasis on the
anticipatory and normative elements that characterize this rela-
tion (perceptual content). Agent’s abilities and norms in general
are just agent’s features, some of which seem invariant (e.g.,
anatomy) and some of which could be developed or lost (e.g.,
skills, beliefs, etc.) through time. The invariants of the environ-
ment are also features of the situation. But these environmental
and agential relata are not sufﬁcient to make a relation (percep-
tual content) anticipatory and normative. The relation becomes
anticipatory and normative, when the agent manages the respec-
tive interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs (constituent relata)
by evaluating them with respect to the consequences they have
for its norms (the anticipatory dimension) and by characteriz-
ing these anticipated outcomes as possible or not, right or wrong
(the normative dimension). We should also note that it is not
necessary for the agent to be aware of its abilities in order to
proceed in the perception. The situation will dredge them up at
the time of perception, in the sense that during perception the
agent becomes aware of its interoceptive relata even though it
could misinterpret them. Thus, we argue that the perpetual con-
tent (what is perceived) is an emergent value-rich anticipatory
relation, which cannot be reduced to interoceptive plus extero-
ceptive perceptual processes. It is this anticipatory and normative
relation that makes affordances interactive. In our understand-
ing, affordances are value-rich anticipatory relations that indicate
an interaction potentiality. Therefore, we would say that while
an agent should in principle not be aware of anything about its
climbing abilities in order to interact with the stairs, it becomes
aware of itself when it perceives (i.e., forms an anticipatory rela-
tion) that it can “possibly” climb a step (the perceptual content)
notwithstanding the fact that this content has always the possi-
bility of being in error. This is opposed to explanations (see, e.g.,
Sauchelli, 2013), which are based on anticipation that presup-
poses established knowledge and experiences. Of course, training
(learning) could reduce the possibility of error by supporting the
perceptual processes in the future. To distinguish the above inter-
pretation of affordances from other conceptions established in
different frameworks than the one presented here, the concept
of “interactive affordance” has been suggested to denote all those
value-rich indicated potentialities of interaction that emerge in
agent’s perception (Xenakis and Arnellos, 2013). Then, perception
constructs interactive affordances.
For instance, a served table in a restaurant is not only a basic
affordance for seating and eating. The whole situation affords
anticipation for gathering and socializing in case the agent’s norms
support such social interactions. So, gathering is an anticipatory
relation and could be the content of perception. For example,
anticipating a gathering involves values for both the indications
(internal or external) that support this social interaction. These
values exceed the information that is available through ambient
light by a served table. Values are changing dynamically according
to the norms of the agent and may form either anticipation for
spending pleasurable moments, or for arguing with friends, etc.
What a served table affords is not only a matter of the abilities
of the agent but also a matter of its social norms (e.g., the agent
knows that its friends are edgy and disagreeable by the end of the
day) or other optimal norms (e.g., an optimal gathering is the one
that everything will go smooth and ﬁne). So, all these evaluated
indications may inﬂuence the perceptual content thus altering the
way an agent perceives and acts each time it interacts with a served
table. For instance, an agent may perceive an annoying gathering
(interactive affordance) through the table but it may also prefer
this possibility in case its norms for friendship are stronger than
its anticipation for an annoying gathering. Thus, in our view the
content of perception (potentialities for action or interactive affor-
dances) is neither permanent nor objective. It rather alters as the
agent establishes its anticipatory relation to its environment. Based
on the framework presented so far, the perception of interactive
affordances presupposes normative content, which is dynamic and
subjective.
As we’ve already mentioned, normative evaluation allows an
agent to prepare itself for action by identifying the sources of
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success and error in a particular interaction. Preparation and eval-
uation plays an integral role in the construction of anticipation by
affecting the way an agent perceives the interactive affordances in
order to select the action the agent believes will best contribute to
its goals (Wenke and Fischer, 2013). So, anticipation is dynami-
cally determined by certain evaluative outcomes with respect to a
combination of internal and external conditions under which the
interaction will succeed and will thus bring the agent closer to its
goals.
The possibility of failure of the anticipation introduces uncer-
tainty in perception with respect to the consequences of the
interactive indications e.g., the agent does not know if the din-
ner table will surely result in another annoying gathering (even
though it is possible). Agents perceive interactive affordances and
make decisions that could be uncertain with respect to the optimal
achievement of their initial goals. Interacting with an airplane’s
cockpit is for everyone (but experienced pilots) an uncertain situ-
ation in the sense that non-trained persons are unable to anticipate
the consequences of their actions in relation to choices that a
pilot should make for a safe ﬂight. Therefore, agents develop
ways that will handle and reduce their uncertainty in percep-
tion. Learning (training) is a very important process that results in
the reduction of such uncertainty in perception. Through learn-
ing, agents can develop ways to evaluate indications of potential
interactions, to anticipate the result of their perceptual outcomes,
to prepare themselves, and possibly to learn to modify their
actions when things do not go well (Christensen and Hooker,
2000).
However, also agents perceive situations with which they are
not familiar, and for which learning is not currently available. In
these cases, agents could also develop other ways to reduce their
uncertainty in perception. As we argue in the next section, “the
aesthetic,” and particularly, “aesthetic” emotional values, emerge
mostly in uncertain conditions where learning is not available and
the agent’s competence in such interactive challenges does not
presuppose an optimal interaction. It is proposed that the respec-
tive emotional processes are a crucial aspect of perception as they
contribute to the reduction of uncertainty through the assign-
ment of values to indications of potential interactions (interactive
affordances), thereby facilitating meaningful patterns of activity.
“AESTHETIC” EMOTIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN SENSE-MAKING
The majority of writers argue in favor of the involvement of basic
emotional activity12 in any kind of aesthetic experience (Higgins,
2008; Prinz, 2011). Those who study the underlying activations
in the human brain during aesthetic perception describe aesthet-
ics on the basis of the gratiﬁcation that someone feels during
the interaction with objects (of art) involving mainly emotional
pathways (Barry, 2006; Cela-Conde et al., 2011; Chatterjee, 2011).
12Basic emotions (Ekman and Friesen, 1971) are evolved in experiences or/and serve
biological functions related to survival needs of the cognitive agent (Averill, 1994).
Authors like Ortony and Turner (1990) are critical of the entire notion of basic
emotions. However, as Fox (2008, p. 89) explains scientists have agreed among
criteria that can be used to distinguish basic emotions from moods and feelings.
Following Panksepp’s view, we use basic emotions as basic tools providing agents
“with sets of intrinsic values that can be elaborated extensively via individual and
cultural learning” (Panksepp, 2007; 1819).
Additionally, the anticipation of the impact of choices on the
basis of reward values is detected in brain areas that are mostly
known for emotional processing during an aesthetic experience
(Cinzia and Vittorio, 2009; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). In most
of these studies, including those from an evolutionary point of
view, authors should reconsider the distinction between art and
non-art, based on results demonstrating that the brain areas pro-
cessing the aesthetic response to art overlap with those involved in
any adaptive perception (Brown et al., 2011; Rolls, 2011). Because
of this, it seems that emotions are involved in any activity related
to “the aesthetic” (Brown et al., 2011; Xenakis et al., 2012). As
we argued in section “Perception Within a Normative Account
of Sense-Making,” a normative account of “the aesthetic” presup-
poses that the content of aesthetic perception is evoked in order
to play a speciﬁc role in making sense of the current situation.
So, an important step toward an explanation concerning aesthetic
perception is to ground “the aesthetic” (and its role) during sense
making in emotional functionality.
Almost all theorists of emotions claim that pleasure and pain
have a strong inﬂuence on adaptive behavior (Nelissen et al., 2007;
Brehm et al., 2009). Roughly speaking, an abstract description of
emotionsnormally consists of a typeof processing that analyses the
stimulus, and then, through an evaluative process, it signals other
processes that control actions and plans (see, e.g., Baumeister et al.,
2007; Rolls, 2011). Emotional evaluations detect opportunities
and threats, as well as the potentiality of an interaction. Hence
they inﬂuence the agent with respect to how it should act in a given
interaction. The normative function of emotions is the elicitation
of signals that emerge from the prospects for norm satisfaction or
failure (Rolls, 2011).
In general, we can say that emotions play a major role in sense
making: an active contribution to the preparation for establish-
ing a relation between the agent and its environment (Xenakis
and Arnellos, in press). As already mentioned, meaningful pat-
terns of activity require the construction of value-rich relations
between the agent and its world. Emotions fulﬁll this constructive
role. Several quite recent accounts in the ﬁeld of neuroscience and
psychology share the idea that emotions receive inputs not only
from sensory modalities, but also from the internal milieu they
continuously monitor, thereby providing the agent with real-time
inputs regarding the whole state of its body (interoception; Dama-
sio and Carvalho, 2013). Neuroscientiﬁc evidence emphasizes the
fact that during global emotional activations, these inputs enable
comparisons of past, present, and future feelings, stored norms
and expectations based on acquired internal models of personal
or social behaviors (Craig, 2009). The outcomes of such eval-
uations are emotional signals that produce anticipatory values,
whose intensity is a crucial aspect that inﬂuences the potential
motivation to satisfy those norms. Emotional values thus are
future-oriented. They are associated with indications of potential
interactions, which accordingly suggest the agent should remain
neutral, or, alternatively, to move toward the incentives and away
from threats. Speciﬁcally, positive emotional values are associated
with indications that correspond to the satisfaction of a norm
(the agent is doing ﬁne or perhaps better with something than it
needs to). They form perceptual contents that allow the agent to
anticipate a reward from the execution of their interaction plans.
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In contrast, emotions with negative values are associated with
indications that correspond to interaction failure, in the sense
that they are elicited when the agent anticipates problems with
the satisfaction of its norms (the agent is doing worse than it
needs to; Pugh, 1979; Carver, 2001; Prinz, 2011; Xenakis et al.,
2012).
It is also widely accepted that such emotional evaluations could
inﬂuence the anticipatory system in cases in which there is no
relevant history that the agent could recall, while it attempts
to resolve its perceptual uncertainty (Rolls, 2011; Grupe and
Nitschke, 2013). This is strongly supported by experimental evi-
dence, which shows that emotional evaluations do not occur when
everything is familiar in an ongoing interaction. On the contrary,
in uncertain situations, where a purely rational analysis of the
available choices is insufﬁcient, decisions are made mainly on
the basis of emotions (see e.g., Bechara, 2004; Dalgleish, 2004;
Bar, 2009; Craig, 2009; Singer et al., 2009). Emotional values are
elicited so as to prepare the agent to decide between potential inter-
actions through the development of strategies for the reduction of
its uncertainties and the control of its experience (Pessoa, 2008;
Heilman et al., 2010). Activations in a circuit running through
brain areas involved in emotional processing (the orbito-frontal
cortex (OFC) – the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) – amygdala –
OFC) show that emotions provide the agent with an updated feed-
back system that uses emotional values to reform anticipation.
Through this feedback system, emotions perform a cost-beneﬁt
analysis of new signals that are compared to existing anticipa-
tion (Hampton et al., 2007; Pessoa, 2008; Grabenhorst and Rolls,
2011), thereby providing a continuously updated preparatory sys-
tem (Paton et al., 2006). Each time those circuits are used there is a
possibility for better predictions and the perception of the object
becomes progressively less uncertain, while, simultaneously, the
agent develops progressively more functional meanings (Staple-
ton, 2013). In other words, (and in accordance to Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013), the emotional state according to which the agent
feels like is possible (or not) to engage in an uncertain interaction
context, is formed indirectly as a content that describes a state
of the body, and which is accessible to the organism in which it
occurs, thereby providing subjectivity to the respective perceptual
processes.
Both the provided framework on perception and the exper-
imental evidence on emotional functionality described above
are the conceptual and theoretical basis upon which we model
and explain the minimal content of aesthetic perception and
the respective potential preferences that are realized in everyday
interactions.
A MODEL FOR AESTHETIC PERCEPTION AND ITS MINIMAL CONTENT
According to the arguments made so far, in its minimal form “the
aesthetic”is related to an emotional process that supports the agent
to form meaningful patterns of activity, thus contributing to the
resolution of uncertainty. The need of perceivers to reduce the
interaction uncertainty when they have difﬁculties in detecting a
potential interaction outcome is what gives rise to“aesthetic”emo-
tional responses. Such responses are values evoked from evaluative
processes of interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs in relation to
self-deﬁned norms and goals. According to the analysis in section
“Perception Within a Normative Account of Sense-Making,” per-
ception is understood as a preparatory process, during which the
agent forms a value-rich anticipatory relation with its world by
constructing interactive affordances. Then, in the proposed frame-
work, a particular perception should be considered “aesthetic” when
emotional values are involved in the construction of the interactive
affordances, i.e., when the detected indications of potential interac-
tions are emotionally evaluated. It is in this way that an agent comes
to establish a feeling of preference with respect to its relation to
the world. In other words, we suggest that agents perceive aes-
thetically when they feel like it is possible or not to engage in an
uncertain situation. It follows that the minimal content of aesthetic
perception is an emotionally valued interactive affordance on the
basis of which the agent feels like is possible (or not) to interact in
the current context. Let us explain all these through an example of
an everyday interaction.
Consider the act of “posting a letter.” Let’s suppose that for a
given agent, the proper or preferred way to post a letter (i.e., what
characterizes the optimal realization of this action) is to hand the
letter directly to a postal agent. In other words, the agent’s uncer-
tainty for the respective act is at its minimum (or even null) when
he will be able to arrive at the post ofﬁce and hand the mail to a
post ofﬁcer. For whatever reason, when this goal cannot be satis-
ﬁed optimally, the particular agent is uncertain for the respective
action. It goes without saying that this optimal way of interac-
tion is a personal and self-established norm of the agent. Quite
incidentally, the agent did not make it on time and his alterna-
tive option is to use the mailbox13. In this example, we stipulate
that the agent is uncertain about using the mailbox for “posting
a letter,” and he will have to evaluate the indications of poten-
tial interactions with the mailbox. This is the moment when the
agent tries to reduce its uncertainty by establishing a feeling of
preference of those interactive indications that are mostly antic-
ipated to bring it closer to its optimal way of posting. Since the
agent’s knowledge about the consequences of the act of “posting
a letter through a mailbox” is minimal or non-existent, the agent
should then somehow manage to proceed in the interaction. Due
to this uncertainty, the evaluation of these indications will have an
emotional nature (see Perception Within a Normative Account of
Sense-Making and “Aesthetic” Emotions and Their Role in Sense-
Making for details), which will provide to the whole perceptual
process an aesthetically dimension. As said above, the outcome
of this emotional evaluation is a value that contributes (either
partly or totally) to the anticipatory content by suggesting that
the current situation (context-mailbox-agent) will afford or not
the agent’s level of optimal posting. In this respect, the agent is
about to establish a feeling and thereby to construct the minimal
content of its aesthetic perception of the mailbox. For instance, a
positive feeling would emerge when the interactive indications,
which are numerous (e.g., the usage of the slot as the entrance
for the envelope), would be emotionally evaluated as denoting the
potentiality for the optimal realization of “posting a letter” (and
13The mailbox example was chosen to avoid complex description. One could
think of an indeﬁnite number of cases, where a user is anxious and feels awk-
ward when it interacts with various kinds of machines such as checking-in devices,
ATMs, ticket machines, but also contemporary electronic and electrical appliances,
cockpits, etc.
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this is the minimal content of this particular aesthetic percep-
tion). Now, since in our example the interactive indications of the
mailbox are not compatible with the agent’s norms for optimal
“posting,” it is highly likely that the interaction would end at this
point in time, provided that the agent–through its perception–
would have established a negative feeling that would not indicate
an optimal posting. However, agents also have other evaluative
mechanisms that contribute to the formation of their percep-
tual content (e.g., rational inferences based on habits, and/or
analogy making, etc.). For instance, the agent could form a
negative feeling for posting the letter using the mailbox but for
whatever reasons it thinks it ought to do so. Therefore, in all
but the cases where those other evaluative mechanisms are not
available, the minimal content of aesthetic perception does not
determine but rather inﬂuence the agent’s preference or/and ﬁnal
judgments/actions. This is because emotional and cognitive eval-
uations are integrated and equally contribute to the perceptual
content in such complex behaviors. According to Pessoa (2008;
155), “emotion and cognition are only minimally decompos-
able.” “A decomposable system is one in which each subsystem
operates according to its own intrinsic principles, independently
of the others.” The minimal content of aesthetic perception is
related to this particular aspect of the emotional subsystem, whose
operational principles are independent from cognition during
perception.
But let us extend the example. Imagine that this time the agent
should deﬁnitely post the letter and ﬁnds two mailboxes when
arriving at the closed post ofﬁce. They are completely functionally
identical with respect to their structural characteristics (e.g., same
size, same slots, etc.), but one has a fresh coat of paint, whichmakes
it look brand new, while the other is quite rusty but has a sticker
depicting a person with a hat and a moustache facing toward the
user and reaching out his hand. According to the classical concep-
tion of aesthetics, the paintedmailboxwould be possibly perceived
as “pretty.”However, according to the norms of our agent, the fact
that something looks brand new and shiny does not imply an opti-
mal interaction with it (e.g., think for instance someone that for
whatever reason refuses to buy well-polished shined apples from
the grocery shop or a well-painted second-hand car). On the con-
trary, there is a high possibility that our agent will choose the
second mailbox as, notwithstanding his uncertainty, he evaluates
the respective indications (e.g., the depicted postman) as affording
a much more optimal interaction, always according to his norms.
More speciﬁcally, due to uncertainty, the evaluation of the interac-
tive indications are also of an emotional nature, and the respective
outcome could be a positive feeling because the agent would see in
the sticker the postman he would like to have been able to interact
with in the ﬁrst place.
In either case, when the agent decides (for whatever reason)
to use the mailbox and the letter ﬁnally reaches its destination,
the respective choice will be characterized as successful, thereby
providing the act of “posting a letter through the mailbox” a new
meaning. This feedback loop provides the agent with the capacity
to learn from its actions, to accordingly trust (or not) its feel-
ings, and consequently to form more elaborated evaluation in
the future. Recurrent successful interactions with similar mail-
boxes may reduce the uncertainty of interaction with them and
most likely will change the optimal way of “posting a letter” by
constructing the respective preference.
It is clear in our example that we argue against “existing” or
“established” aesthetic phenomena, but on the contrary, we con-
sider these phenomena as emergent. Our claim is that an aesthetic
perceptual content is a matter of the agent, it is dynamic and it is
altered as the situation changes. Therefore, we oppose arguments
that ground aesthetic perception in an externally imposed content.
In this respect, there are no “aesthetic activities” per se, but there
is a type of perception that can be considered to fulﬁll minimal
requirements for what could be inter-subjectively and (epistemo-
logically) conceived as“aesthetic.” In this way, it would bewrong to
talk about objects that are aesthetic per se. “aesthetic” is considered
the indications of potential interactions, when they are emotionally
evaluated with respect to the way they serve (the degree of fulﬁllment
with regard to the optimal) an interaction to the world. Thus in a
naturalized context “the aesthetic” is nothing more than a way of
interaction. It is a way to cope with the environment, and aesthetic
perception functions (in a bio-cognitive manner) in the service of
that coping. Accordingly, aesthetic interactive indications are not
features or properties of the artifact but instead emerge as the
agent decides to emotionally make sense of the current interactive
situation. Thus, aesthetic perception provides the agent a norma-
tive way to determine if the interactive indications hold or not.
Thus aesthetic perception is normative with a dynamic content.
Speciﬁcally, when the mailbox is detected and evaluated positively
or negatively (i.e., indicates the optimal, for the agent, “posting of
a letter” or not), the anticipation for the outcome of the partic-
ular interaction is inﬂuenced, and the interaction uncertainty is
reduced. This practically means that, whatever the reasons based
on which the agent’s interaction with the mailbox could have been
halted so far, the agent, through the aesthetic perception, is no
more in a symmetrical relationship with the mailbox but it now
constructs potential ways of interaction. Therefore, aesthetic per-
ception inﬂuences the agent’s anticipation in away that contributes
to the reduction of interaction uncertainty, while it enhances the
agent’s adaptability. No matter what, the indication of a“fresh coat
of paint”has always the possibility of interaction failure, when, for
instance, the slot is closed or themailbox is full of letters. The“slot,”
the “fresh coat of paint,” etc. are among an indeﬁnite number of
indications that inﬂuence the way an agent aesthetically perceives
a mailbox as a means of “posting a letter.” This is what differenti-
ates our perspective from others that relate the perception of “the
aesthetic” to features of the object. Aesthetic perception is evoked
not due to speciﬁc characteristics in the object, but because of the
agent’s need to detect and evaluate indications of potential interac-
tions with the object. Thus, interactive affordances and aesthetics
are not two different aspects that work together during percep-
tion, but rather the aesthetic facilitates (and enhances) the agent’s
ability to perceive interactive affordances (Xenakis and Arnellos,
2013).
As Gibson (1975; 320) has argued, it does not make sense to
speak of two separate kinds of perception, an ordinary and an
aesthetic one. Rather, “There is only one kind of perception, the
perception of the world with the meanings and values already
in it.” However, in our view, while there is one perception, the
underlying processes available that contribute to the construction
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of the perceptual content vary. Several complex interrelated func-
tional systems, when needed, serve the formation of a perceptual
content in different conditions of interaction. According to the
model we present here, aesthetic perception concerns those inter-
active cases (when uncertainty is high and there is no relevant
knowledge available) in which emotions are elicited to evaluate
the interactive indications.
In accordance with our model, experimental evidence indicates
that, quite often, interactions with very low uncertainty render
beholders bored after a while, and any aesthetic aspect of interac-
tion gradually disappears (Carbon, 2011). On the contrary, when
uncertainty is increased, aesthetic emotional activity is evoked
again, which increases the possibility of new aesthetic percep-
tions. When such uncertainty is anticipated to be easily resolved,
agents have more chances to form positive aesthetic perceptions.
This could possibly explain the reason why objects, with which
users are confronted, and which they characterize as innovative
and novel, are also found to provoke mostly positive aesthetic
perceptions (Tinio and Leder, 2009; Carbon, 2011). Addition-
ally, experimental results demonstrate that when perceivers are
exposed to objects prior to learning about their features, they can
ﬁnd them more attractive, even when the respective features result
in decreased functionality. In contrast, when interaction uncer-
tainty is increased to unacceptable rates (e.g., through conﬂicting
visual and verbal information with respect to an object), negative
aesthetic outcomes can emerge (Hoegg et al., 2010). AsCarbon and
Leder (2005) have argued, a combination of innovation and famil-
iarity seems to have increased possibilities for positive aesthetic
perceptions.
The consideration of “the aesthetic” as a way to cope and better
understand the world by reducing the uncertainty of interaction
allows us to rethink the division of perception between “prag-
matic” and “aesthetic” forms. An understanding of “the aesthetic,”
which is not associated only with art, but also underlies a practi-
cal engagement with objects, may not be obvious (Dissanayake,
1982; Schulkin, 2009) for it rejects, to a large degree, a well-
established tradition. However, there are an increasing number of
neuropsychological studies that support our argument concern-
ing the relation between aesthetics and potentialities for action.
Recently, Righi et al. (2014) provided evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that aesthetic values allow perceivers to enhance the
detection of potential actions and, consequently, the detection of
motor affordances (see also Xenakis and Arnellos, 2013), show-
ing that objects that are perceived to work better and to be highly
attractive have a privileged and selective neural activation. Addi-
tionally, activations in brain areas related to preparation for action
suggest a coupling between the perception of an object and the
type of action that could possibly manipulate it (Baber, 2006).
Moreover, these activations overlap with areas responsible for the
emotional evaluations of the possible consequences of the poten-
tial action (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Etkin et al., 2011; Waszak
et al., 2012).
Summarizing, what agents may perceive as aesthetic in an
object is any combination of indications that could aid them in
reducing their uncertainty of interaction and to accordingly feel
like they are clearing their path toward a successful choice for an
optimal interaction. This conception of “the aesthetic” provides a
normative character to aesthetic perception setting aside any claim
that considers its scope useless in everyday interactions.
CONCLUSION
Several approaches and studies suggest a transcendental account
of “the aesthetic.” These are concerned mostly with special fea-
tures that objects should exhibit in order to provoke an aesthetic
perception. This long tradition conceives “the aesthetic” in an
externalist and art-centered context of rightness but fails to explain
many phenomena that are intersubjectively taken to pertain to“the
aesthetic.”
Wehave argued that all these phenomena should be dealtwithin
a different theoretical and explanatory framework. We have pro-
vided a model of aesthetic perception, and in particular, we have
suggested the organizational requirements for the emergence of
its minimal content. The theoretical and conceptual basis allowed
us to address the naturalistic grounding of important theoreti-
cal issues such as: (i) why agents form aesthetic responses during
their interactions with objects, (ii) what are the conditions under
which the aesthetic phenomenon occurs, and (iii) what constitutes
a minimal content of aesthetic perception. Our model addresses
also other issues such as (iv) whether it is legitimate to differentiate
aesthetic perception from other forms of perception, and (v) the
possibility of reducing aesthetic perception to the features of the
object. Our intention was neither to explain aesthetic phenomena
in their entirety nor to explainwhat an agent ﬁnally likes or dislikes
based on judgments of preference or beauty. Thus we don’t deal
with the outcome of particular aesthetic judgments, but we aim at
providing an explanatory basis of how“the aesthetic” emerges and
evolves in an agent.
Ourmodel emphasizes the importance of a normative aesthetic
perceptual content pertaining to its anticipatory nature, since the
content speciﬁes what is supposed to be perceived aesthetically
(and here lies the normativity). The proposed model stresses that
the aesthetic perceptual content is a matter of the agent, it is
dynamic and it changes; therefore, it denies the existence of an
externally imposed content or values. We don’t deny the impor-
tance of external invariants in the environment, but we consider
them to play a supportive role, as the role played by the agent’s
abilities and norms in the formation of an aesthetic perceptual
content by the agent itself.
The strategy adopted here allows to overcome many theoretical
and methodological problems that arise when naturalists attempt
to explain complex aesthetic interactions (mostly with works of
art) in the context of basic adaptive behavior and agency (see
Brown and Dissanayake, 2009; Dissanayake, 2009; Brown et al.,
2011; Bundgaard, 2014). In this way, the proposed model sup-
ports a general theory of aesthetic responses beyond works of art.
Aesthetic perception is understood in the realm of social and com-
municative interactions, which do not necessarily result in positive
or negative aesthetic judgments but promote comprehension
through individual/personal and social cognition.
Weproposed that a particular perception is considered aesthetic
when an emotional evaluation with anticipatory features assigns
values to interactive indications (interactive affordances) in situa-
tions that are mainly characterized by high degrees of uncertainty
and minimal knowledge. In other words, aesthetic perception is
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the interactive state in which the agent emotionally feels that it is
possible (or not) to interact in the current conditions. However,
these emotional feelings do not necessarily determine the agent’s
preferences and/or actions. Agents, according to their degree of
autonomy and the respective bio-cognitive organization, are able
tomanage values and norms in favor of theirmost important goals
and to act accordingly. In this respect, there are no“aesthetic activ-
ities” or “aesthetic objects” per se, but there is a type of perception
that can be considered to fulﬁll minimal requirements for what
would be inter-subjectively and (epistemologically not ontologi-
cally) conceived as “aesthetic.” Hence, what is aesthetically right
or wrong should be associated to norms and emotionally evalu-
ated interactive affordances that reduce uncertainty by clearing the
path for successful interactions.
This model differs from any other explanation and model that
deals with “the aesthetic” as an extra component of perception.
However, a question that emerges from the above considerations
is what type of agents has the capacity for these aesthetic percep-
tions? According to recent theoretical works, mainly in the realm
of evolutionary biology, this question may ﬁnd its answer in non-
human agency (see, e.g., Prum, 2012; Killin, 2013; McCormack,
2013).
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